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Theoretical and Comparative Aspects of
Reapportionment and Redistricting: With
Reference to Baker v. Carr*
Dr.CharlesP. Edwards**
Dr. Edwards in this article applies political theory to evaluate the
impact of reapportionment and redistricting on representative government. In so doing he discusses the sources of this political theory and
the goals of representative government. He also surveys comparative
political practice in Great Britain and the United States. In suggesting
various legislative, administrative,and judicialremedies to malapportionment and inequitable districting, Dr. Edwards concludes that the effect
of the present litigation resulting from the Baker v. Carr decision will be
to arouse public opinion and prompt legislatorsto meet the accumulated
challenges of urbanizationas well as other contemporary demands.
I. INTRODUCTION

The significant decision of the United States Supreme Court, Baker v.
Carr,) finding legislative districts in the State of Tennessee violative of prin-

ciples of rationality and the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the
fourteenth amendment and remanding the case to the federal district court
for further action, represents the culmination of several decades of rising
dissatisfaction with legislative reapportionment and redistricting in the
United States. It also represents the beginning of a judicial, and doubtless
political, venture along virtually unchartered seas. Although reapportionment and redistricting are uniquely an episode in the game of politics-and
indeed has in the past been found by courts to be a "political question" in
accord

ith Colegrove v. Green 2-nevertheless, it also presents an exceptional

opportunity for the reexamination of basic principles of our philosophy of
*The initial portion of this paper through the subsection "Goals of Representation"
was presented at the Annual Conference of the Pennsylvania Political Science and
Public Administration Association in Harrisburg, April 6-7, 1962, and is included in the
publication of the papers presented at this conference, by the Institute of Public
Administration, the Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania, 1962.
Authority to use this material is granted to the Vanderbilt Law Review by the Association and the Institute of Public Administration. The author was chairman of this
conference.
*International Relations Officer, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C.; former Director of Political Studies, Westminster College, Pennsylvania.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent
those of the United States Government.
1. 369 U.S. 186. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1962, pp. 18-20.
2. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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representative government. This is true despite the patina of positivism
that overlays all contemporary social science, for that positivism would be
agonizingly sterile without political theory to supply many of the propositions for empirical examination. An understanding of theory and of comparative, historical, and statistical data can clarify the intent of framers of
statutes and constitutions, as well as the purposes implicit in political systems such as representative government in the United States. Moreover,
despite the apparent dominance of positivist jurisprudence, the Justices of
the Supreme Court continue to invoke higher law imperatives of constitutional rationality, as witness the notable Brown3 and Baker cases of this
decade. Such invocations to reason based on philosophic jurisprudence
might appear to some as cavalier usurpations by the Justices of the free
play of contending political forces, especially where "political questions"
are involved, but the general public has often demonstrated that it is prepared to accept just this when fundamental constitutional principles are at
stake. Furthermore, the judicial process supplies an adversary system which
does accomplish a confrontation of the pertinent facts in the light of an
open court; there is also stare decisis and enough experience with latent elements of due process and equal protection of the laws to provide judicial
standards.
Finally, of course, political theory can provide political weapons, albeit
perhaps chiefly for the losing side. Rarely are cries of "unfairness" and
"unconstitutional" heard more than when articulated by the victims of the
gerrymander, for, as Sir Austen Chamberlin once remarked, "'Unconstitutional.., is a term applied in politics to the other fellow who does something that you don't like."' 4 On a somewhat different level, but in similar
vein, Pennsylvania Republicans gleefully levelled the charge of "ladies
first" at Democrat counterparts when the state's Democratic leadership,
having agreed to abolish one Democratic congressional district, selected
for elimination the only one occupied by a woman.
Fundamental to democracy is the premise that authority is derived from
an enlightened, popular will or wills with equality of participation at one
point at least. Therefore, those elements of political theory involving
democracy, equality, and representation are the facets especially relevant
to a study of reapportionment and redistricting. In the interest of definition,
reapportionment can be described as determination of ratios and units of
representation chiefly by legislative bodies pursuant to constitutional and
statutory mandates. Redistricting, by contrast, connotes more the political
process of drawing-or attempting to draw-such units, be they mandated
or permissive, and the resultant configurations of such districts, both congressional and state legislative. The American Founding Fathers rejected
3. Brown v. Board of Edue., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Quoted in BurLER, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEm IN

BRITAIN 142

(1953).
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direct democracy, not only because it was too capricious, but because it
was obviously impossible in a well-constructed Republic of continental
dimensions.5 On the other hand, there is ample evidence to conclude that
the Fathers' intended elements of democratic control lodged upon an
equality of voting power, at least at the base of the House of Representa7
tives; 6 they also intended election for the House by means of districts.
Given these elements, the only assurance of equality among voters would
be equal proportions between voter to district and all voters to all districts,
or at least a proximate equality of such ratios given the impossibility of
mathematical exactness-hence the necessary application of political theory
to evaluate the impact of reapportionment and redistricting on representative government.
II. SOURCES OF THEoRY

It is pertinent to examine at the outset classical (Graeco-Roman) concepts because the Founding Fathers were steeped in this tradition, both
through direct knowledge and through the pervasive influence of the later
disciples of these theories: Locke, Montesquieu, and the adherents of neoStoicism in general. Although the matured Greek and Roman city-states did
retain elements of direct government in the form of primary assemblies
open to all male citizens, nevertheless, considerable elements of representative government (government in which ultimate decisions are made by
elected representatives) were also present.8 One of these was the Athenian
Council of 500, based upon election from geographic localities or demes
intended to supply representation in proportion to population.9 The enduring image of the aristocratic Roman Senatus also comes to mind. Of equal
impact on the future of political institutions were the writings of Aristotle
and Polybius, based upon their respective observations of the Greek and
Roman systems. Aristotle's well-known empirical and normative defense
of constitutional democracy suggested popular selection and control of leaders by means of several alternative combinations involving the rule of
numbers and the rule of wealth with broad-based property distribution
among a middle-class. This was matched by the Polybian discovery that
the Roman amalgam of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy resulted in
checks and balances able to respond to any emergency.' 0
5. See TnE FEDERA,sT No. 10 72-74 (Beard ed. 1948) (Madison).
6. Anthony Lewis writes that: "An examination of the historical material demonstrates
that a right of equality of representation can be drawn from the Constitution." Lewis,
Legislative Apportionment and the FederalCourts, 71 HAzv.L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1958).
7. See statement of Hamilton to the New York Convention, June 21, 1788, quoted
in 1961 CONG. Q. WREELY REP. 678.
8. LAnSON, REPRESENTATIVE CoVyN.mENT IN GREEK AND RorAN HISTORY 1-21
(1961).

9. Id. at 12.
10. For an assessment of the impact of Polybius upon the authors of the United
States Constitution, see EBENSTEIN, GREAT PoLrrceAL TEmKERs 111 (3d ed. 1960).
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Montesquieu's subsequent doctrines in his Spirit of the Laws, so persuasive to the thinking of the Founding Fathers with regard to equality, liberty, popular government, election, roles of assemblies and upper chambers,
confederation, and separation of powers, echo his classic masters. Surely
the current Supreme Court criterion of rationality in schemes for representation districts-including such tests as "fairness," "equal protection," and
opposition to district disparities amounting to "invidious discrimination"can draw insights from this classic heritage.
Another thread of classical influence, more important for the judicial than
for the legislative branch, is the theory of natural law, traceable to the
early Stoics, adumbrated in the writings of Cicero, the Scholastics, and
neo-Stoics such as Grotius, and codified in norms and maxims of Roman
Law. From this comes the symbolism of social compact, property rights,
majority rule, supremacy of legislative bodies, and the premise of harmony
of interests among men endowed with natural reason wanting only a common judge. The shaping influence of John Locke, expositor par excellence
of rationalist natural law and natural rights, upon American values as well
as representative institutions hardly requires reference.
John Locke's common judge was somewhat more than a common law
judge, for in its centuries of meandering growth before and after the publication of the Treatises of Civil Government, the English Common Law had
inevitably acquired some elements of philosophic-natural law-jurisprudence." Indeed, in Coke's famous lecture to James I, the law was described as a contrivance of human reason;' 2 it was also claimed as the
distinct province of the judge not only to find it, but to assert it as
against the prerogative of the Crown and Parliamentary statutes. The
supremacy of common law judges over statutes, asserted by Coke in his
Bonham's Case'3 but subverted by the later assumption of Parliamentary
sovereignty, took root in the United States, was shaped by Colonial and
Revolutionary court precedents, and led finally to the Hamilton-Marshall
doctrine of judicial review. The Constitution, as higher law, was henceforth
to be safeguarded against conflicting statutes by those with a natural right
to do so, the people's judges. But the Constitution, as Professor Corwin
pointed out in his The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law,14 is also higher law; it is, in short, reason embodied by social
contract, the reification of natural law, a single written document to be
safeguarded for the ages by judicial review through which the latent ration11. Cf. PoUND, THE Spnrr OF THE CoMMoN LAw ch. IV (1921).
12. Id. at 61. To be sure, Coke intended "artificial reason" as against "natural
reason," but there was a subsequent blending of Coke's concepts with natural law
elements. Id. at 95.
13. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
14. CoRwix, THE "Iher LAw" BACKGROUND OF AmI=cECA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

(1959).
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ality of due process would unfold. If this were not enough, the Radical
Republicans following the Civil War endowed the Justices of the Supreme
Court and lesser courts with the "equal protection of the laws" clause of
the fourteenth amendment to be applied as a limit upon the states.
Henceforth a broad-axe of rational jurisprudence was sharpened to strike
down that which was discriminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, devoid of
rationality, lacking reasonable standards, as well as violative of due process.
To be sure, at the outset, corporations as juristic persons enjoyed the
protections of the clauses originally designed for benefit of negro citizens,
but the Court has lately, as in Brown v. Board of Education,15 returned to
meanings originally intended for the fourteenth amendment by its authors
(at least, according to Justice Black). And now, in Baker v. Carr,the Court
has taken jurisdiction in an action brought by citizens under the fourteenth
amendment and has pointed the way to equitable remedies for malapportionment of Tennessee legislative districts.
The threads of classical and natural law influence upon contemporary
articulation of representation in the United States are interwoven with
a third significant influence: that of nineteenth century English utilitarianism. To be sure, Bentham and his disciples hardly affected the shaping
of the American Constitution itself, but their influence upon the development of democracy in America is not doubted.16 Given the commitment of
government to the greatest happiness of the greatest number and the equality of individual assessments of pleasures and pains, it was only logical to
select representatives by counting heads, the more heads counted the better.
And so universal suffrage arrived in the Anglo-American world within a
century of Bentham's demand for it, together with a strengthened approach
to individual equality in the exercise of the ballot. A contemporary British
authority on election practice notes that universal suffrage treats every
elector as equal and states that therefore, the ratio between electors and
elected should be everywhere the same; he concludes that "the principle
of equal electorates is the direct and inevitable consequence of universal
suffrage."' 7 In other words, malapportionment of election districts violates
present democratic political theory, as well as the more esoteric invocations
to reason and to history.
In actual fact, contemporary British districting practice does support the
Benthamite imperative that electoral districts be drawn in such a way to
safeguard the equality of each and every vote. Under recent Representation of People Acts, expert impartial Boundary Commissions-in essence,
appointive, administrative boards-draw district boundaries within set timeintervals in accord with parliamentary statutes calling for population equal15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. See GRmES, AMEICAN PoLrrcALr THOUGHT 289-91 (1955)

for references to

utilitarian influences. See SCHLESiNGER, THE AGE OF JACKSoN 78, 123 (1949).
17. Ross, ELECTIONS AND ELcTORtS 101 (1955).
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ity consistent with respect for traditional community identities. 18 D. E.
Butler writes of British practice that "there has certainly been no deliberate
gerrymandering in the drawing of boundaries." 19 British practice does
indeed provide analogies valid to the political climate in the United
20
States.
III.

GOALS OF BPrESENTATION

Although democratic theory does demand equality in popular participation, a true representation-system must consider more than people or
numbers; other values, for example, property, territory, leadership, restraints
on power, also have claims. The very end of government, according to
Locke, is the preservation of property, and property qualifications both for
electors and office-holders were once traditional. Another significant
method employed to achieve multiple representation is to appoint or elect
upper chambers representing property and community interests. In The
FederalistNo. 60, Hamilton anticipated that a durable supremacy of landed
interest would be lodged in the Senate, although, as Hamilton stressed,
the Constitution itself prescribed no property qualifications. 2 1 The Fathers
also fully expected the Senate to become a continuing body of more
knowledgeable and experienced statesmen, able to check the lower house,
but chiefly, of course, to provide for equality of representation of the states.
Thus, the principle of geographic and other representation in the upper
chamber of the bicameral national legislature was basic to the federal
plan; but this is also true in election of Senators in upper chambers of
twenty-nine states.&2 2 Likewise, in England boroughs and counties have
been traditional units for selection of members of the lower House, 23 and
respect for locality boundaries continues among the present criteria in
Parliamentary instructions to British Boundary Commissions used in establishing constituencies. 24
This facet of territorial and community identity can be discerned in the
mere fact of the traditional single-member congressional districts used in
18. BuTLEn, THE ELECTORAL SYsTEm IN BmTAIN 1918-1951 96 (1953). For further
commentary on this subject see "The British Model," pp. 1275-78 infra.
19. BuTLn, op. cit. supranote 18, at 195. (Emphasis added.)
20. Gabriel Almond indentifies an analogous Anglo-American political system in

ALiroND, Comparative Political Systems, in

POLrTCAL BEAVIOR

21. See THE FFDERALIST No. 60 259-60 (Beard ed. 1948)

34 (Eulau ed. 1956).

(Hamilton).

22. Based on author's cross-tabulation taken from table on Apportionment of Legislatures, as of November 1, 1961, in THE BOOK OF STATES (1962-63 ed.) (data obtained prior to publication).
23. Ross, PARLIAMENTARY

REPRESENTATION

118-26

(1944)

(historic

sketch of

evolution of Parliament and Commons).
24. Under the Redistribution of Seats Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 26, the Boundary
Commissions are to "follow local boundaries as far as practicable." Bur. INronmsATION SERvICES, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN BRITAIN 2 (Sept. 1958).
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the United States, 25 and is even more marked in methods of determining
districts to elect members for the lower houses in state legislatures as well
as the upper chambers. Twenty-seven states employ a mixed system involving population and locality, while three other states base their lower
house districts entirely on localities.26 Indeed, in Baker v. Carr, the Court
did not specifically say that districts must be based on population exclusively; Justice Brennan's opinion referred rather to "'arbitrary and capricious' districting violating the Constitution, without defining them
[districts]. " 27 Hence, a possible consequence of this opinion might be to
reinforce geographic representation, probably as regards upper chambers,
while accepting the principle of equitable population representation in the
lower houses. 28 If this does result, Baker v. Carr may not generate all the
relief for the urban voter alleged, and the theory of geographic representation in at least one house of state legislative bodies will be strengthened,
up to the point at least of "invidious discrimination."
At this writing, this particular point is under litigation. To be sure, in
the recent Michigan apportionment case, Scholle v. Hare,2 9 the Supreme
Court voted by a margin of 7 to 1 to return for reconsideration by the
Michigan Supreme Court a case which challenged the legality of apportionment of the state senate by area instead of by population. Subsequently,
however, Justice Potter Stewart of the United States Supreme Court
granted a stay of the resultant Michigan court's order that the state senate
be reapportioned on a population basis or that state senators face election
at-large;3 0 this case is complicated by revised reapportionment provisions
in a new state constitution to be voted on in April 1963, and the Supreme
Court will doubtless review the case again in its 1962-63 term.
Arthur Bonfield suggests that this matter of equal protection of voters
and invidious discrimination against them must be resolved within the
context of a prior determination by the Supreme Court that genuine
republican government does exist as required by the guarantee clause of
the Constitution. 31 Possible yardsticks on representative-republicanism to
be developed by the Court might be: (1) no state to permit control of
either house by a smaller proportion of the electorate than at the time of
admission, or (2) no state chamber to be controlled by a percentage less
than the 16.5 per cent of voters currently selecting a majority of the United
25. On this point Anthony Lewis writes that: "Representation based on districts ...
tends to accommodate both geographic and numerical interests." Lewis, Legislative
Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAzv. L. Rxv. 1057 n.3 (1958).
26. See author's tabulation of data in table on "Apportionment of Legislatures,"
in TAE Boox oF STATEs 54-55 (1960-61 ed.). Also see Appendix, p. 1291 infra.
27. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1962, p. 19, col. 7.
28. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1962, p. 21, cols. 1-9.

29. 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
30. Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 863 (1962) (stay order).
31. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 9.
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States Senate. 32 Baker did not construe the guarantee clause.
Finally, some conclusions based upon the capacity of representative
government to achieve competent leadership are pertinent to the problem
of carving legislative districts. The Anglo-American approach to government has never accepted the Rousseauvian concept that members of legislative bodies are mere deputies closely chained to the mystical general will
of the sovereign mass; nor do Anglo-American goals of representation
accept the common law analogy of people as principal and representative
as agent. True, the history of representation in the United States, and also
in Britain, reveals oscillations between tendencies sometimes towards the
agency or "direct" theory, other times towards the independent representative or "virtual" theory; 33 and, to be sure, members of lower chambers are
more tightly bound to their constituents' apron-strings than their more
august counterparts, whose senatorial profiles are sometimes marred by
the mandates of courage. Nevertheless, the oft-quoted Burkean concept of
the representative exercising mature judgment and an enlightened conscience as a trust on behalf of district and nation,3 is still the model for
present practice-at least between elections. This ideal was strongly
endorsed by John Stuart Mill in his Representative Government.35 Likewise, Madison's normative assertion of the capacity of representative
government to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country .

.

.

."3

is a proposition now

tested by empirical studies on both sides of the Atlantic. J. F. S. Ross,
in his ParliamentaryRepresentation, examines the data on age, education,
profession, income, and length of service in Parliament, to show that "the
House is not a reproduction of the nation in miniature, but something
different."3 7 It is different in the sense that Members of Parliament exceed
national norms as regards levels of education, income, professional skills,
and so forth. Similar in approach is Donald Matthews' study of "United
States Senators and the Class Structure,"w documenting the considerably
superior levels of Senators-social and economic-compared to the national
norms surveyed. More significant to correlations between district configurations and the role of actors in Congress, are the admittedly tentative
propositions set forth in a research design proposed by Eldersveld, Leiser32. Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. F Ev. 245 (1962).
33. LucE, LEGsLATIVE PRINcrp.is (1930). Chapters XX and XXI present a historical survey.

34. Id. at 439-40.
35. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS

ON REPnESENTATIVE GOVEMNMIENT

240.

36. BEARD, THE ENDURING FEDEr ALa 73 (1948).
37. Ross, PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION 118 (1944).
38. Mathews, United States Senators and the Class Structure, in POLITICAL BEHAviOR 184-93 (1956).
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son, and others to the effect that inter alia: (1) "the behavior of legislative
leaders differs significantly from that of the rank and fie of the same party"
tending towards greater loyalty to the administration; and that (2)
administration-directed loyalty of congressmen "will be directly correlated
with the leader's socio-economic status .. . [and] ... inversely correlated
with his length of residence in his constituency. . ., allowances being made
. . . for the norms characteristic of the section in which his constituency
lies." -9
The propositions presented above suggest that there may be few positive
correlations between the action of the representative and the combined
will of his district-or at least less positive correlation than generally supposed. This is because of alleged superior qualities of the house member,
his relative freedom to exercise independent judgment, and also the conditioning process of group dynamics in legislative bodies directed by
institutionalized elites, not to mention the restraining impact of other
chambers and branches. Likewise, it is generally agreed that the state
assembly member is under even greater control of the chamber leadership
than his counterpart in the national Congress. If this is indeed true, then
the actual configurations of electoral districts are less significant than the
utility of such districts in selecting representatives with claims of republican legitimacy-as tested, for example, by voter suits charging invidious
discrimination or absence of genuine republicanism. In short, diversity in
district construction is valid up to the point at which a justiciable action
is or may be found in favor of the voter-plaintiff. The author is, of course,
aware that generalizations based upon relationships between district and
representative can be advanced only with caution in view of the fact that
a science of legislative behavior, and the variables involved, is at a beginning stage; 40 much systematic work remains to be done.
Thus far, then, the traditional bases for representation (population,
property, and territory) have been examined; there is no need to explore
the theory of functional representation (representation by vocation or class
rather than by region or people) in the Anglo-American system, since its
final vestiges were abolished in Britain by the Representation of the People
Act of 194841 and it has never been expressly used in the United States. On
the other hand, a system of proportional representation, particularly the
Hare system of the single-transferable vote,42 has its adherents on both
39. Eldersveld, Research in Political Behavior, in PorrsL BE VIoR 79 (1956).
40. See Ogul, Research on Legislative Process in Congress, in THE LEGISLATVE
PnocEss N1rCoNGEss AND THs STATES 13 (1961). These are papers which were pr&sented to the annual conference of the Pennsylvania Political Science and Public
Administration Association in 1961 (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, Institute of Public Administration, Aug. 1961).
41. The Representation of Peoples Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 65.
42. This is a system of proportional representation. "According to the Hare Rules
the voter indicates his preferences among the various candidates by making his first
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sides of the Atlantic; and it is agreed that this system does mirror with
precision all shades of a popular universe and thereby does guarantee an
equality of all votes where population is the chief determinant. Furthermore, the fact that single-member districts are not used in the Hare system
obviates this type of districting problem. Nevertheless, despite potent
supporters and some tentative experience, this system has never taken root
in British and American experience and is now in decline. Doubtless the
principal cause for the failure of this ingenious method was the presence
of splinter elements which it introduced into the symmetry of traditional
Anglo-American two party politics. Given two parties, the purpose of an
electoral system is to obtain a majority able to govern and to retain a
minority able to oppose, particularly in the disciplined British two-party
system. The single-member districts, returning by pluralities and not
quotas or lists, do accomplish this end. In short, in the Anglo-American
world, there is no practical alternative to election of representatives from
single-member districts for at least one chamber of legislative bodies,
hence the central significance of district configurations.
One must note that internal structural aspects of representative bodiesorganization, rules of procedure, staff services, income and terms of members, and the like-vitally affect the responsiveness and responsibility of
legislative chambers. Consideration of these factors is clearly beyond the
scope of this particular paper.
The purposes of representation, then, are to provide for people, property,
and territory; to offer limits to power; to select members of superior competence; and to assist the functioning of two-party government. Singlemember districts are requisite, and the drawing of such districts to achieve
standards of proximate equality and rationality is certainly basic to
democratic doctrine. Moreover, it may also be required to best achieve
the multiple purposes of representation in a representative-republic as
described in this paper. In the absence of valid theory and sound historic
perspective, no possible framework exists within which to construe the
imperatives of the "equal protection of the laws." Theory, then, provides
weighty arguments, arguments perhaps more pertinent to treatises and
judicial opinion than to the party caucus and legislative chamber. To be
sure, practice in the the United States does suggest that inequalities among
voters due to malapportionment and maldistricting may be the rule,
equality of the individual vote, even at the representation base of one
choice and his succeeding choices with the appropriate numerals. The first step in
the count, the determination of the quota, involves dividing the number of valid
ballots by the number of candidates to be elected plus one and completing the quotient
to the next round number. All candidates having more than the quota are declared
elected and their surplus ballots are transferred to the next available choices. After
this is done the low men are eliminated in turn and their ballots transferred in the
same manner until all the offices are filled." XII ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 541-42 (1934).
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chamber only, the exception. Theorists and judges must recognize the
established political practices and processes, chiefly state legislative practices subject to congressional standards for congressional districts, for
principal determination of the election districts and hence the relative
weights of votes. Nevertheless, Baker v. Carr gives notice that the legislator now flagrantly violates theoretical, comparative, historic, equitable,
and justiciable factors involved in reapportionment and redistricting under
risk of judicial review and remedy.
A survey of current practice in the United States, as well as possibilities
for political and administrative adjustment and remedy, is clearly an
essential prelude to the potential for judicial action and remedy latent in
the Baker decision. At the outset, however, a backdrop of comparison to
British practice can be instructive.
IV. THE B~mrsH MODEL
Comparisons to British theory and practice are pertinent to theory and
practice in the United States; indeed, Gabriel Almond, in an article on
"Comparative Political Systems," identifies a distinct Anglo-American
political system.43 In point of fact, an occasional reference to British
experience appears in recent hearings on redistricting bills brought before
the House Judiciary Committee, 4 and it is invoked at length in Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Baker v. Carr.45 Specifically, the method
of plurality election by single-member districts, and resultant political turmoil over the creation and configuration of such districts, has been at the
heart of Parliamentary reform for over one hundred years.
It will be remembered that Jeremy Bentham and his "philosophical
radical" disciples helped pioneer the first significant modern statutory
reform of Parliamentary elections, including abolition of rotten boroughs
and enfranchisement of new municipalities, in the justly historic Great
Reform Act of 1832.46 Qualified successes continued throughout the nine-

teenth century, although "Redistribution Acts were, to begin with, highly
controversial." 47 By the Gladstone era, equality in redistribution had become a "serious political issue" although Gladstone himself "repudiated
the principle of precise mathematical equality in redistribution." 48 Thus,
the present method of fairly periodic drawing of reasonably equal constituencies by expert and impartial Boundary Commissions is the con43. Almond, Comparative Political Systems,

in Por-ricAL BmAVIOR

34-42 (1956).

44. Hearings Before the Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 34 (1961).
45. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
46. 2 Will. 4, c. 45.
47. BuTLErt, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEm nsT BrrAiN 1918-1951 5 (1953).
48. Id. at 6.
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sequence of a century of pragmatic British "muddling through."49
D. E. Butler reports the year 1918 as a turning point in electoral reform,
with Britain moving from medieval to modem and uniform approaches. 50
Notably, that year saw the first successful use of the Boundary Commission,
which drew constituency lines according to proximate population equalities
on the basis of recommendations from a Speaker's Conference. 51 It was not,
however, until the Representation of the People Act of 194452 that the
principle of permanent Boundary Commissioners was accepted by Parliament.53 A major redistribution of seats in 1948, as a result of significant
population shifts, left only eighty of six hundred and thirty constituencies
untouched,5 4 and this despite the fact that the majority party, Labor, was
somewhat adversely affected by the redistribution. 55 Seemingly a political
tradition, commenced in 1918 and with roots back to 1832, of impartial
redistricting by administrative experts under delegation from Parliament,
had overcome the partisan pressures generated in reapportionment and
redistricting. By the general elections of 1950 and 1951 "biases" as regards
the constituencies had "for the most part disappeared."5 6
The Redistribution of Seats Act of 195857 introduced certain refinementssuch as extending the time period for reports by boundary commissioners
to a maximum of fifteen years between reports-but the basic elements of
the post-1918 approach remain. Four Boundary Commissions for the
United Kingdom, each chaired by the Speaker of the House and composed
of senior civil and judicial personnel, are instructed to establish electorates
in each constitutency conforming as nearly as possible to the average
population of all and with locality boundaries followed as far as practicable.58 A previous maximum limitation of twenty-five per cent variation, permitted above or below average, has now been rejected as too stringent to
maintain community boundaries and identities.59 Notices of proposed
changes are published to invite appeals; final redistricting is established by
Order in Council subject to affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parlia49. Butler writes: "Reform was always on a pragmatic level .....
Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 1.
51. Id. at 10, 11.
52. Redistribution of Seats Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, c. 41.
53. BumTEm, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEm IN BarrmN 1918-1951 96 (1953).
54. Id. at 32.
55. Id. at 112. Partisanship, however, was displayed in debates on the bill. Id. at
135-36.
56. Id. at 199. This does not mean that actual population equality obtains as between constituencies. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion notes considerable
inequality as regards populations of British districts. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 266
(1962) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
57. 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 26.
58. BmrT. INFORIMATION SERVICES, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN BnrrmN 2 (Sept.
1958).
59. BuTmm, op. cit. supra note 18, at 104, 206 (1953).
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ment.60 In consequence, a problem that once vexed the halls of Commons
and Lords and continues to vex the legislative chambers and party caucuses
in the United States has been shunted to the limbo of vital, but virtually
forgotten, reform victories in Britain. Deliberate gerrymandering no longer
exists in Britain, writes D. E. Butler,61 who anticipates that the next decade
will be "even more devoid of parliamentary contention on electoral matters
than the last few have been."62
Certain elements within the British model are of particular relevance
when considering analogy or transfer to the American model. Virtual
abolition of malapportionment and maldistricting as regards Parliamentary
constituencies was achieved within the context of partisan and pragmatic
politics, with little overt invocation of theory or principles involving
representation. Apparently, over time, reform leadership coupled with
growing voter expectation of fairness and equality in redistricting conditioned the practical politics of both parties; as noted above, even the
Labor Party Government in 1948 accepted a somewhat adverse redistribution. To be sure, when respect for localities so demanded, permissive
variations in district population even beyond an attempted limitation of
twenty-five per cent above or below the average might on the face appear
excessive. 63 However, as American practitioners well know, various biases
can be introduced even where populations among districts are equal. British
authorities do affirm that the various biases associated with gerrymandering
and malapportionment in general have indeed been effectively contained
in British practice; doubtless the technique of the expert, impartial administrative boundary commission under broad delegation from Parliament
supplies one answer. Broadly comparable administrative apportioning
agencies are used in fourteen states of the United States with constructive
effect.6
There is no record of significant resort to judicial remedies in the British
experience; British courts have rejected suits challenging the authority of
Boundary Commissions. Because British courts do not exercise judicial
review over statutes on the basis of judicial interpretation of a written
60. Id. at 211.
61. Id. at 195.
62. Id. at 139.
63. This factor is cited as proof of enduring excessive inequalities among constituencies by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 301-02
(1962) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.). The author does not have precise data
on actual population deviations among British constituencies but is aware that such
deviations exist. The point, perhaps overlooked by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, is that the
districts are established by an impartial agency, and voter expectations of fairness are
thereby satisfied. A figure of a permissive twenty per cent deviation above or below
average is endorsed by the American Political Science Association and appears in a bill
on congressional redistricting offered by Representative Emanuel Celler. H.R. 73, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
64. See cross-tabulation charts, Appendix, p. 1291 infra.
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Constitution and specifically under an "equal protection of the laws"
clause as applied against territorial subdivisions of a federal state, judicial
remedies are not indicated.
V. TE AmnmucAN MODEL, CUMRENT PRACrIcE
By contrast to present British practice, the gerrymander and other
65
varieties of malapportionment are much in evidence in the United States.
Not only is this an accepted element in the political game, it is an element
viewed by politicians and sometimes judges alike as uniquely the province
of the political departments.
Strictly speaking, the gerrymander implies the application of contorted
physical shapes for an intended partisan gain, although it can be loosely
used to describe any districting based on partisan political motive, such as
gross population disparities or a failure to redistrict which continues a
beneficial status quo (the "silent gerrymander").66 The contemporary
redistricting of congressional districts, resulting from reapportionment
based on the population changes following the 1960 census, has produced
all varieties-as witness the so-called New York "Rockymander." There
clever contortions of district lines promise a shift from a Democrat balance
of one seat to an anticipated Republican balance of nine seats in that state's
congressional delegation, while at the same time keeping all forty-one
districts within 15% of average district population. 67 Or contrast the
California preference for gross malapportionment as regards variations in
district population which runs from 43% above to 27% below the norm.6 8
The dominant Democrats in California were thus virtually assured that
California's gain of eight seats, the largest of any state since the Civil War
(following a given census), would become a margin of eight for the
Democrats over the Republican Congressional delegation after the 1962
elections. 69 The equally dominant Republicans of New York anticipate
congressional delegations of 25 Republicans to 16 Democrats from New
70
York as a partial consequence of their gerrymander.
In all, 25 states were affected by congressionally directed reapportion65. The "hoary tradition" of gerrymandering is referred to in Newsweek, Nov. 27,
1961, p. 21, col. 2. Congressional Quarterly points out that "historically, parties
controlling the governorship and both chambers . . . have frequently run roughshod
over the interests of the minority party in the state by carving out gerrymandered and
malapportioned districts." 16 CONG. Q. ALmANAC 826 (1960).
66. Varieties of malapportionment are described in Lewis, supra note 6, at 1059.
67. 1961 CONG. Q. WEmcLy REP. 1868.

68. Ibid.
69. Id. at 1280.
70. Id. at 1868. For an account of the New York districts , see 1962 CONG. Q.
WEEry REP. 370. New York's 68-year-old formula favoring rural areas in apportionment is now challenged in an action brought by Radio Station WMCA and other
residents. N.Y. Times, April 4, 1962, p. 1, col. 2; id., Aug. 2, 1962, p. 1, col. 4.
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ment ratios following the 1960 census, as determined by the operation of the
Automatic Reapportionment Act of 1929,71 with 9 states gaining congressional seats and 16 losing them. 2 With 3 exceptions (Arizona, Florida,
and New Jersey) the 9 states gaining seats typically left them to the chance
of the state-wide "at-large" election. Faced with the formidable threat of
at-large elections for entire congressional delegations in case of failure to
redistrict following the 1960 reapportionment, all of the 16 states losing
seats managed to meet 1962 deadlines for establishing new districts. To
be sure, where one party controlled all political departments (the governor's office and both legislative chambers), there was little likelihood of an
at-large election, and the notorious gerrymanders such as in New York
and California resulted. Matters were far different in Pennsylvania, Missouri, Illinois, Alabama, and Massachusetts, where the parties divided
control of the political departments or the dominant party itself was split
by contending factions.73 In Illinois and Pennsylvania special sessions of
the state assemblies had to be called; Massachusetts, in an extended session,
barely met the constitutional dead-line.
In Pennsylvania, which was faced with the loss of three seats, the largest
loss of any state, the virtual Republican "veto" in the state senate eventually forced on the Pennsylvania Democrats (who controlled the House and
the Governor's office) the mid-winter special session of 1962. This session
managed an admittedly "makeshift and stopgap" compromise with no
"significant changes in the existing arrangement of U.S. House seats."7 4
The reduction of three seats was secured by the abolition respectively of
one safe Republican and one safe Democrat seat, with the creation of a
large "swing" district in the central part of the state by merger of two
seats, one from each party. 5 The plan was the work of an inner elite of
skilled practitioners of the art of the possible in politics and had been drawn
up in party caucuses even before the calling of the special session of the

state assembly.7 6 It was introduced at the session on January 22, 1962, and
there was little impact from concern for theoretical standards of equitable
reapportionment. Indeed, "considerations such as fairness, equity, compactness, etc., were given only lip-service throughout."77
71. 46 Stat. 26 (1929), as amended, 55 Stat. 761 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2(a) (Supp.
1961).

72. 16 CONG. Q. ALmANAc 825 (1960). For reference to the Automatic Reapportionment Act see Margolin, Apportionment of Membership in the House of Representatives,

Sept. 1962 (unpublished monograph in Library of Congress).
73. Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 27, 1961.
74. 1962 CONG. Q. WEEKLy REP. 216.
75. Id. at 371. A "bitter battle" was predicted in the new "swing" district during
the 1962 election. Ibid.
76. Id. at 217. This was confirmed by the author in correspondence with a member
of the Pennsylvania House.
77. Letter from Thomas W. Adams to the author, March 8, 1962; in the same letter
Dr. Adams quotes Representative McCormack (Democrat, Philadelphia) speaking on
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Although few unusual shapes, except for districts in Philadelphia, resulted from the Pennsylvania redistricting, the scheme was most heavily
criticized for rather large variations in district populations, adversely
affecting the burgeoning suburbs adjacent to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.78
By contrast, all five districts within the city of Philadelphia were below
the norm, as was true of three of the four in Allegheny County (greater
Pittsburgh).79 If Pennsylvania is typical of population shifts over the past
decade, it is not only the urban centers themselves which are often underrepresented but also their adjacent suburban localities. Apparently in
Pennsylvania the "Old Guard" Republican leaders of the caucus were not
willing to stage a fight on behalf of equality for the underrepresented
suburbs; consequently, the Pennsylvania Democrats registered a slight
advantage out of the redistricting, with Democrat districts averaging seven
per cent under the state norm, and alleged Republican districts four per
cent over.8 0 The Democrats are thus expected to pull within one or two
seats of the Republican majority of the state's congressional delegation in
the fall elections.
If any one conclusion can be drawn from this survey of congressional
district reapportionment, it is that the time-honored techniques of gerrymandering are firmly entrenched. Both parties, when commanding the
necessary pinnacles of power, produced monuments of malapportionment
as judged by theoretical standards of compactness, contiguity, and equality
of population; both were justified by the rules of the game. To be sure, the
comparative advantages gained were doubtless cancelled out, with at most
an anticipated net national Republican gain of five seats following the 1962
congressional elections resulting from redistricting.81 At the same time,
Republican districts throughout the country averaged about 35,000 persons
more than Democrat ones,82 and variations in populations as great as
sixty-two per cent from the average population of all districts were
recorded. 83
the floor of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, January 23, 1962: "We must
recognize that this is political. We are politicians. We are dealing in politics ...
You cannot submit a reapportionment program that is not political." Dr. Adams observed at first-hand the Pennsylvania special session in capacity as a Pennsylvania
Citizenship Clearing House fellow. For a full account of this session see Adams,
The Politics of Congressional Reapportionment in Pennsylvania, in PA,'zns PnsENTED
AT THE ANNUAL CoNFERENcE oF THE PENNSYLvAmA POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADmINISmATION AssocATioN (1962).
The conference was held in Harrisburg on

April 6th and 7th and the papers were published by the Institute of Public Administration, The Pennsylvania State University.
78. 1962 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RsaE.216.
79. Id. at 217.
80. Id. at 216.
81. 1961 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1231. For a survey of final results of the 1961-62
redistricting, see id. at 362-71.
82. National average, based on the 1960 census, is 410,481 persons for each congressional district; 430,380 for Republican and 395,459 for Democrat.
83. 1962 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 216.
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Significant to the interplay of interests in the United States is the 'fact
that this politically-oriented system of redistricting reinforces an advantaged
rural status quo at the expense of underrepresented and proliferating
urban-suburban majorities.84 Writing in the Harvard Law Review in 1958,
Anthony Lewis labelled failure to meet rapid urbanization problems as a
major national failure "stemming in large part from the underrepresentation
of urban areas in the state and national legislatures."8 5 A case in point
could be the defeat of a proposed Urban Affairs Department by the 87th
Congress, in which 194 negative votes from rural districts more than offset
86
the 106 affirmative votes representing the urban and suburban districts.
VI. STATE LEGISLATIVE Dismirs
The practice of gerrymandered state legislative districts is equally part
of the American model, and because the states in turn determine the
congressional districts, this practice directly affects the complexion of the
national Congress. Not considering various state constitutional mandates
designed to safeguard special interests of community localities, the obstruc'tion to majority rule within the states is striking. The National Municipal
League's Compendium of Legislative Apportionment shows, for example,
that in only 6 states do forty per cent or more of the electors elect a
majority of the legislature, and in 13 states one-third of the population or
87
less can elect a majority of both chambers of the state legislature.
Extreme examples of this kind of malapportionment are supplied by
Connecticut's lower house, controlled by less than twelve per cent of the
population, and Vermont House districts, not apportioned since 1793,
where the 48 persons of the town of Victory elect one member as do the
33,000 persons of the city of Burlington. 88 Although 42 states require
reapportionment at least once every ten years (36 for both houses), 12
states are currently in violation of these mandates, and an additional 5 states
84. In Tennessee, for example, two-fifths of the population elected more than threefifths of both houses. U.S. News and World Report, Nov. 6, 1961, p. 101, col. 1. See
also O'Hallaren, A FairShare for the Cities, The Reporter, Nov. 12, 1959, p. 22, col. 2.
85. Lewis, supra note 6, at 1058. Lewis also attributes continuation of one-party
states to malapportionment. Id. at 1063.
86. 1962 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 275, 276.
87. Editorial, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1962, p. 36, col. 1.
88. See 1961 CoNe. Q. WEEKLY REP. 531, 532; A.mucAN CiviL LmRzrtEs UNIoN,
41ST ANNUAL REPoRT: TxsTnic Wnrmrm TnAT NATION 32 (1961). For a historical
survey of state apportionment practices, and the rural-urban relationships, see LucE,
LxnsrxLvE PnNcr LEs 356-80 (1930) (Chapter XVI "apportionment under the
union"). Arthur Bonfield notes the percentage of electors controlling the following states' geographically based houses as follows: Nevada 8, California 10.7, Vermont
11.6, Connecticut 12, Florida 12.3, Arizona 12.8. He doubts that such extremes could
possibly meet the substantive quality of "republican government" requisite under the
guarantee clause of the federal constitution. Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on
the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 245, 259
(1962).
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have failed to meet other mandated requirements. 89 Pennsylvania, for
example, has not reapportioned its senatorial districts since 1921, and a
recent study by that state's Internal Affairs Department reports 3 instances
in which senatorial districts appear to be in violation of the state constitution.9 0 Additionally, 10 Pennsylvania counties are overrepresented and
8 are underrepresented in the House-notably the third district Montgomery
county, 410 per cent above average, and the sixth Philadelphia district, 61
per cent below.91 To be sure, Pennsylvania constitutional provisions preclude an equality based exclusively on population, but a house district
reapportionment based on the 1960 census would record gains in 8 counties
and losses in 10 requiring district changesP2
Although, to be sure, the majority of states have been carrying out
reapportionment and redistricting mandates at least superficially, the
disparities that exist between districts have been increasing with the
advent of burgeoning metropolitan areas.9 3 Moreover, until Baker v. Carr
the promise of effective remedy was not in sight. Legislative fairness, writes
Lewis, "is inhibited by factors built into our political structure. Once a
group has the dominant position-as rural legislators generally have-its
overriding interest is to maintain that position."94 In short, politicians are
adversely affected by basic changes in the rules of the game that present
new risks to them, and few will willingly vote themselves out of a job. In
Tennessee, for example, a reapportionment is required as to districts for
election to both chambers every ten years, but the Legislature had refused
to act since 1901. Finally, the under-representation of the urban voters of
Nashville became so gross that it prompted the action brought by Charles
Baker and associates against the Secretary of State of Tennessee on the
ground of an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection of the laws.
Baker sought relief in the courts only after political means had been found
wanting.9 5 Dramatic evidence of widespread district inequities is given
by the fact that within two months of the Baker decision, suits challenging
89. See author's cross-tabulation tables, Appendix, p. 1291 infra. Anthony Lewis
writes: "But failure of the legislatures to act is by far the more significant source of
unequal representation." Lewis, supranote 6, at 1060.
90. PENNsYLvANIA DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS,
PN, SLVANLA 10 (1961).

E-APPORTIONMENT

IN

91. Id. at 25, table 4.
92. Id. at 20, map 11.
93. Lewis writes: "Effects of malapportionment are much graver today than they
were a century ago.. . . Rapid growth of our population and change in its character
make even more urgent . . . adjustment of representation.

Lewis, Legislative Appor-

tionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1095-96 (1958). Bonfield
also notes that urbanization has augmented distortions at the expense of majorities.
Bonfield, supra note 88, at 262.
94. Lewis, supra note 93, at 1091.
95. For a recital of the facts see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See also 134
SCIENCE 1677-79 (1961).
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constitutionality of legislative districts in 21 states had been

Mied.9 6

Before turning to an examination of administrative and judicial remedies

to malapportionment, it is necessary to survey the powers of the United
States Congress as regards congressional districts, as well as the approach of

Congress to reapportionment and redistricting of such districts.
VII.

Tm CONSTUTION AND CONGRESS

Based upon the language of certain provisions of the Constitution, 97 as
well as the historical materials surrounding their construction, it can be
affirmed that election by single-member districts as well as a right to
equality of representation for each voter is intended, if not required, by the
Constitution as regards elections for the House of Representatives.9 8 Other
provisions, such as the clause guaranteeing to the states a republican form
of government (article IV, section 4) and the first section of the fourteenth
amendment, could be utilized by the Congress to impose similar standards
upon the states as regards state elections for at least one chamber 9 The
Constitution and amendments, notably the fifteenth, would void discriminatory electoral practices based on race-practices such as the notorious Tuskegee gerrymander overturned in Gomillion v. Lightfoot.100 The
Civil Rights Acts of 1957101 and 1960,102 in essence voting rights acts, are
based upon such provisions. Indeed, the Civil Rights Commission established by these acts, in its report and recommendations on voting, urged
that Congress should consider legislation requiring that voting districts be
substantially equal in population when the state legislature is based on
96. Legal actions are pending in the following States: Alabama, California, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
97. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2 (3) (on apportionment); id. art. 1, § 4 (1) (the "times,
places and manner of holding elections" clause). Lewis says that "In addition to
Article I, a federal right to equality of representation in the House may be based on
various provisions in section I of the fourteenth amendment." Lewis, supra note
93, at 1076.
98. According to Lewis, "An examination of historical material demonstrates that
a right to equality of representation can be drawn from the Constitution." Lewis,
supra note 93, at 1058. See also Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Increasing the
Membership of the House of Representatives and Redistricting Congressional Districts
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 183-84 (1961), for
statements on the intent of the framers.
99. A system of state legislative representation could "be so unreasonable as to offend
the equal-protection and due-process clauses . . . ." of the fourteenth amendment.
Lewis, supra note 93, at 1077. Indeed, upon this basis rather than on the basis of the
guarantee clause, the Supreme Court took jurisdiction in the Baker case.
100. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
101. Civil Rights Act, 1957, 89a 71 Stat. 634, as amended (codified in scattered
sections of 28, 42 U.S.C.).
102. 89b 74 Stat. 86 (1960), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (Supp. I1 1962).
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population, and granting federal courts jurisdiction of suits to enforce the
requirements of the Constitution and federal law in regard to electoral
103
districts.
Congress thus possesses ample power not only to apportion the congressional districts among the several states pursuant to population shifts
following each decennial census, but also to establish uniform standards for
districting by state legislatures, with power to compel enforcement of its
standards. 104 Pursuant to this authority, between the years 1842 and 1929
Congress wrote into apportionment statutes the requirements that mandated single-member congressional districts drawn by the states be of
"contiguous territory," be "as nearly as practicable [of] an equal number of
inhabitants," and be "compact." 0 5 It must be added that Congress never
provided precise statutory definitions or sanctions.
The undoubted implied power of Congress to enforce statutory provisions suggests in this context a variety of techniques. The Congress could,
for example, (1) legislate more precise standards amenable to delegation of
express jurisdiction to the courts; (2) refuse to seat members elected atlarge or representing malapportioned (gerrymandered) districts; (3) delegate to an administrative agency such as the Census Bureau authority to
redraw malapportioned districts; (4) withold federal grant-in-aid funds
from states with inequitable districts; or (5) draw districts itself.
Clearly, all such remedies would apply only after manifest failure of
traditional political processes within the states to do the job; clearly, also,
the impractical nature of some of these proposals, if not all, from a political
point of view needs no comment.10 6 In actual fact, Congress has never
attempted to district or redistrict a state, nor has it attempted the enforcement of any provisions of reapportionment laws passed from time to
time. 0 7 Indeed, Lewis affirms that effective enforcement of equitable
districting by Congress is "flatly negatived by history and by political horse
sense."108 Administrative or judicial remedies would appear, then, on the
face the only alternatives. By analogy, and on the basis of empirical data
Bxcrs, VoTUNG 141 (1961).
103. U.S. Co ¢NfssioN oN Civm R

104. "It thus appears clearly to have been the intent of the framers of the Constitution to give Congress the power to district or redistrict the States for election of Repre-

sentatives." Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 98, at 70. For a similar position, based
upon statements of Madison and others at the federal convention drawing a federal
power to prevent malapportionment on the basis of the "times, places and manner"
clause, see Lewis, supra note 93, at 1071-72.
105. For a brief history of congressional apportionment statutes see Lewis, supra
note 93, at 1073-74; see also Margolin, supra note 72.
106. Lewis, supra note 93, at 1094.
107. Margolin, supranote 72, at 7.
108. Lewis, supra note 93, at 1093. Lewis suggests that attempts by the Congress,
itself, to establish district lines would generate intense partisan political pressures,
would be spasmodic, might lead to the denial of any representation to certain districts,
and would subject members to uncertainty. Id. at 1093-94.
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presented above in this paper in the subsection on "State Legislative Districts," a similar conclusion can be reached with regard to the carving of
state legislative districts by state legislatures.
In point of fact, by the Reapportionment Act of 1929 as amended by the
Equal Proportions Act of 1941,'L0 Congress actually deleted previous
standards calling for compactness, contiguity, and substantial equality of
population. These statutes provide an automatic procedure for reapportioning the house districts: The Census Bureau, using the mathematics of
equal proportions, prepares after each decennial census for assignment to
state governors through the Clerk of the House of Representatives the
pro rata share of districts available to each state given the fixed House total
membership of 435.110 The actual drawing of the districts is, of course,
left to the states themselves. Under the statutes, states gaining may elect
the additional members at-large; states losing must redistrict on penalty of
electing the entire state's congressional delegation at-large at the next
congressional election following the census.
This threat of entire delegations facing at-large election is a formidable
spur or club to the practical politician. At-large elections of this sort are
expensive, risky, invite publicity-seekers and incompetents, place senior
House members and their seniority on the chopping-block of a chance
"winner-take-all," and tend to distort the complexion of the House. Indeed,
since 1932 "no large states have permitted elections of entire delegations
at-large.""' This threat was undoubtedly the principal spur forcing such
politically divided states as Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, and
Missouri to achieve districting schemes before 1962 deadlines; in point of
fact, the abrupt apparition of a possible at-large election in Pennsylvania
was sufficient to kill, at third reading, the previously strongly supported
1962 House Enlargement Bill.112 Clearly a court order voiding an inequitable districting scheme and presenting thereby the threat of an at-large
election represents a potent instrument.
The situation surveyed in this paper of evident malapportionment and
gerrymandering of congressional and state legislative districts and equally
evident inaction by Congress despite mounting urban-suburban dissatisfaction appears unchanged over the past decade. To be sure, President
Truman in his message to Congress of January 9, 1951, pointed to the
discrepancies among districts and advocated remedial congressional legisla109. 55 Stat. 761 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2 (a) (1958).
110. For statutory provisions and administrative procedures see Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 98, at 178-79. See also Margolin, supra note 72, at 13; ef. 1961 CONG.
Q. WEExLY R P. 274.
111. 1961 CoNG. Q. WEEKmy REP. 678 (1961). This reference includes a discussion
on the dangers latent in an at-large election of an entire state delegation.
112. 1962 CONG. Q. WxxsLY RP. 429; see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1962, p. 1,
col. 4.
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tion where states had failed." 3 Since then a number of bills on reapportionment and redistricting have been introduced and have been considered by
the House Committee on the Judiciary and the subcommittees thereof,
notably proposals frequently reintroduced by Representative Emanuel
Celler of New York. 114 The latest version of the Celler bill would restore
previous provisions calling for compact and contiguous territory for congressional districts and would limit population disparities between districts
to a figure not more than "20 per centum greater or less than the average
obtained by dividing the whole number of persons .. .by the number of

Representatives to which such State is entitled... ."1 A significant feature
of this bill in contrast to past proposals and in view of the Baker case was
a proviso for judicial review of congressional districts "at the suit of any
citizen... by the district court of the United States."" 6 Although this bill
was approved by the Judiciary Subcommittee of the 86th Congress, no
further action in either the House or Senate was taken during that Congress; 117 nor has any final action been taken by the 87th Congress. It would
again appear that remedies outside the chambers of Congress-remedies of
an administrative or judicial nature-must perforce be employed if relief
against gerrymandered districts is to be obtained.
VIII.

ADMINSTRATE AND JuDicL REDImms

The British success with the expert, impartial, essentially administrative
Boundary Commission has been noted above in this paper in the subsection
on "The British Mode'; furthermore, fourteen states of the United States
provide various types of administrative boards with authority to intervene
at some point in the process of reapportionment and redistricting; and
where administrative boards have been used within the states, as in
Britain, there has been a record of constructive accomplishment towards
equitable districting." 8 However, given the fact that the United States is
a federal state with a considerable tradition of state political autonomy in
the establishment of congressional districts, a centrally directed action or
113. Margolin, supra note 72, at 15.
114. For legislative history see Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9 (1961); Hearings! Before
Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 10 (1959); Hearings Before Special Subcommittee on Reapportionment of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 21 (1951). See also 1962
CONG. Q. Wxmmy REP. 429.

115. Hearings on H.R. 4068 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 86 (1961).

116. Ibid.
117. 16 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 826 (1960). Lewis adds, "But a realist must recognize
that legislation like the Celler bill has little chance of passage." Lewis, supra note 93,
at 1095.
118. Id. at 1089-90; see also author's cross-tabulation tables, Appendix, p. 1291 infra.
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review by an administrative agency would encounter greater opposition
than in Britain. Nevertheless, three identical bills in the 87th Congress
referred to a Judiciary Committee Subcommittee authorized the Director of
the Bureau of the Census to redistrict states found in violation of specified
standards for districting. 119 Testifying rather gingerly on this measure,
Census Director Richard Scammon pointed out that the Bureau could do
a pretty fair job of redistricting but that "this legislation . . . would put
me in a rather unenviable position .... ." 2 0 Testifying at the previous hearings, Dr. Howard Penniman of the American Political Science Association
doubted that Congress could provide much more than information and
publicity in the way of enforcement of approved standards calling for
compactness, contiguity, and equality of population above or below a
fairly flexible margin of 20 per cent variation from the norm.12'
In the United States federal system, notably as in the process of public
school integration, it is evident on the record that judicial litigation is going
to supplement legislation in effective enforcement of constitutionally required principles of equality of representation. Not only has Congress
failed to implement the spirit and the intent, if not the letter of the
Constitution, but the political departments of the several states have
generally failed to carry out their own constituent mandates as well as
mandates of the federal constitution as applied to them. Consequently, the
well-known pattern of malapportionment and gerrymandering continues
intrenched, to the present jeopardy of urban-suburban needs. 122 In short,
judicial remedies may well provide the only effective relief now in regard
to the problem of gerrymandered congressional districts. 123 In the states,
administrative boards as well as judicial remedies can be effective as
regards equitable construction of state legislative districts.
Prior to the Baker case, Justice Frankfurter's "political questions" doctrine, enunciated in the leading Colegrove v. Green case, 12 4 involving
Illinois congressional districts, had tended to cause a denial of jurisdiction
by courts in actions involving congressional districts, and by analogy state
legislative districts. Actually, Colegrove may no longer be good law; it
was enunciated by a divided Court, with the majority turning on a concurring opinion by Justice Rutledge who decided on grounds other than
119. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the judiciary,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 18-21 (1961).
120. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9, at 123 (1961).
121. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the judiciary,
86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10, at 38-39 (1959).
122. On the problem of denied urban needs see the reference to amicus curiae brief
submitted to the Court by the Solicitor General, Archibald Cox, in 1961 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REPl.531-32.

123. "It is difficult to see how a policy of equal congressional representation can be
enforced ... without the use of the Judiciary." Lewis, supra note 93, at 1094.
124. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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denial of jurisdiction. In recent years holdings by federal and state courts
indicate a judicial reappraisal of the role of the courts in actions involving
the issue of equal representation casting "considerable doubt as to the
viability of Colegrove v. Green . . . as a lasting precedent."125 Colegrove
can, of course, be justified on the ground that it gave time to the political
departments to effectuate remedies in the absence of judicial sanctions; but
time obviously had run out with the enunciation of the Baker v. Carr holding, which applied specifically to state legislative districts.
Although the Baker case did resolve in favor of complainant the questions of standing, jurisdiction, and justiciability by finding a constitutional
cause of action in denial by Tennessee of equal protection of the laws required by the fourteenth amendment, Justice Brennan's opinion for the
majority did not devise or suggest a specific judicial remedy.126 Rather, this
thorny issue was temporarily foreclosed by the Court order remanding to
the federal district court for further proceedings. Subsequent to the decision, the Governor of Tennessee called a special session of the legislature
to meet in June to redistrict, hoping thereby to avoid lower-court implementation of the Supreme Court decision. The result of that session was
then presented to the district court.
Accordingly, on June 22, 1962, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme
Court that the complaint presented a justiciable constitutional cause of
action, on remand held that the apportionment in at least one house of
Tennessee's bicameral legislature should be based on the number of
qualified voters without regard to any other factor. 127 The three-judge court
concluded that the expedient course to follow, rather than declare the 1962
statutory apportionment unconstitutional, was to allow the 1963 Tennessee
General Assembly, elected under the 1962 statutes, to enact a fair and valid
reapportionment. The court retained full jurisdiction of the matter in order
to assure compliance with its order.
There are an array of conceivable judicial remedies the courts might
invoke involving equity or civil law powers, depending in each instance
upon the facts presented and the forum employed. Such remedies are, for
example: a mandamus to compel legislative redistricting; a quo warranto
to members of malapportioned legislatures; contempt proceedings against
legislators failing to implement a court reapportionment order; an injunction against election officials certifying returns from malapportioned dis125. Statement by Prof. Gordon E. Baker, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 10, at 35 (1959).
Lewis records the action of state courts granting relief in Lewis, supra note 93, at
1066-67. Also see the recital of precedent in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Baker. 369 U.S. at 198-218.
126. 369 U.S. at 235.
127. Baker v. Car, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
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tricts or enjoining a general election pending reapportionment; an order to
establish a court-devised districting scheme; an order quashing a challenged
districting plan with the resultant threat of an at-large election, failing
equitable redistricting by the legislature consistent with established standards. In his amicus curiae brief in the Baker case Solicitor-General
Archibald Cox brought to the attention of the Court remedies judged
suitable, such as an order to state officials to prepare an apportionment
plan for court approval, or the threat of an at-large election resulting from
a court order voiding a challenged malapportionment. 128 The effectiveness
of the at-large threat in compelling states losing 'congressional seats to
redistrict following the 1960 census has been documented above in this
paper. Anthony Lewis also defends at-large elections pursuant to a court
order as "a simple, appropriate, and effective remedy" already supported
by state court precedent. 12 Likewise, Gordon Baker proposed an amendment to the Celler Bill to include a court order that "all Representatives
from such [malapportioned] State be elected from the entire state at-large
until such time as districts ...

conform to the requirements ...

."130

This

does not exhaust judicial ingenuity; for example, a three-judge Wisconsin
court has appointed a special master to draw a plan to reapportion that
131
state's congressional and legislative districts.
Manifestly, application of some of the "remedies" suggested above would
raise problems as grave as the evils challenged-a point emphasized by
justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in the Baker case.'3 2 Nevertheless, this paper has already reached the conclusion that judicial remedies
may provide the only generally effective relief against malapportionment of
congressional and state legislative districts in the United States, a view
impliedly sustained by the majority in Baker v. Carr.
Thus, at this writing, the actual effect of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Baker case is not clear, and the positive remedies not fully
known. More, much more, remains to be done, and additional clauses of
the Constitution, particularly the guarantee clause, await construction.
Whatever is done will be done in part by the ponderous pace of hammering
out judicial opinion in individual actions up through the heirarchy of
courts. Suffice it to say that within two months of the Baker opinion, law-

suits were pending in twenty-one states challenging imbalances of representation, chiefly as regards state legislatures. 133 The Supreme Court of
128. Summary of Cox brief in 1961 CONG. Q. WEmL.y REP. 531-32. For a survey
of possible judicial remedies see Lewis, supra note 93, at 1068-70.
129. Id. at 1070.
130. Statement by Professor Baker, supra note 125, at 35.
131. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
132. 369 U.S. at 266.
133. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1962, p. 20, col 2. Mr. Bonfield states that most of the
suits subsequent to Baker are challenging de lure schemes of state representation
as violative of the fourteenth amendment, rather than the failure of state legislatures
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the United States had additionally returned to the Supreme Court of
Michigan, for "further consideration in the light of Baker v. Carr," an
action challenging gross inequality of senate districts in that state.134 Indeed,
"close observers of the Supreme Court can think of no other recent decision
that has led to so much litigation and political action in so short a time."135
Litigation has well commenced a new approach to a situation not
amenable to resolution by unaided legislation, as is brought out by this
survey of comparative political practice in the United States. Possibly
more effective use of impartial administrative agencies along the lines of
the British experience can be brought to bear on the problem, at least
within state jurisdictions. More equitable apportionment and districting
of state legislative districts is the anticipated result of litigation, which will
in turn promote greater fairness in the drawing of congressional districts
by the states. The Supreme Court may also take jurisdiction in suits
directly challenging congressional districts. The theoretical ends of representation must be served by this process, to enable the nation to better
meet accumulated challenges of urbanization as well as other contemporary
demands. For the present, public opinion has been aroused by the Court,
providing a spur to legislators in addition to the newly attendant presence
of judicial review.
to carry out state constitutional mandates. Bonfield, supra note 88.
134. N.Y. Times, April 24, 1962, p. 1, col. 1.
135. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
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APPENDIX
Cross-TabulationTables on Sets of Variables Affecting
Representationin State Legislative Bodies.*
Table I-Representative Base
Senate
House

People
18 States
17 States

Territory
16 States
3 States

Mixed ('People and
Territory)
13 States
27 States

Not Classified
3 States
3 States

Table Il-Agency Redistricting
By Legislature (Subject By Direct Administrative Board, Ijudicial INo Provision
to Review in Some States) or Administrative Board Review
Review (Both Houses)
39 States
14 States
2 States
1 State

Table IIl-ConstitutionalReapportionmentand Redistricting
Requirement(48 States)
Done
every ten
years:
other than
every ten years:

Not Done

29 States

12 States

2 States

5 States

Table IV-Record of Accomplishment (Both Chambers)
Done
by Legislature:

13 States

by other (Board;
Review, etc):

14 States

*Source: CouNcn,

Not Done
17 States

OF STATE GovERsuzE~s, Apportionment of Legislatures, as of
OF STATES (1962-63 ed.) (data supplied by Warren

November 1, 1961, in THE BOOK

E. Harper, Research Associate, prior to actual publication).

